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CLARIFYING UNCERTAINTY: WHY WE NEED 
A SMALL CLAIMS COPYRIGHT COURT 
JOHN ZUERCHER* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article is concerned with the question of whether copyright law in the 
United States is currently equipped to achieve its original goal, set within the 
U.S. Constitution, to promote innovation and progress. This article suggests 
that copyright law is not equipped to achieve this goal because a paradox 
inherent in copyright law is hindering copyright litigation and causing 
uncertainty. The paradox is found in 17 U.S.C. § 106, which protects 
transformative works that are derivative, and 17 U.S.C. § 107, which protects 
transformative works as fair use. Ideally, the federal courts would solve this 
dilemma by interpreting the appropriate application of these competing 
protections through numerous case-by-case analyses. However, few cases are 
currently reaching the courts or are resulting in judicial opinions because the 
federal court system is ill-equipped for the task due to the expense, time, and 
damages involved in litigation. For effectiveness and to meet the goals of 
copyright, copyright litigation must become affordable, accessible, and timely, 
resulting in more judicial opinions and individual case analyses. To this end, I 
propose a two-fold plan including (1) reducing statutory damages in copyright 
cases throughout all levels of litigation, and (2) introducing a small claims 
copyright court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*  Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Texas Attorney General. B.A., Kansas State University. 
J.D., Texas Tech University School of Law.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine for a moment that a woman, Anna, had a hobby she enjoyed doing 
in her free time.  This hobby revolved around the creation of fan fiction online. 
Anna did not use any of the characters from the different works she wrote from, 
but instead would create new characters, with new stories of their own, within 
the same worlds.  She received no compensation for these works, but over time 
she wrote several stories because she enjoyed being a part of a community that 
shared her interests and she could receive critiques on her writing, which she 
believed would help her to become a better writer.  Then one day, Anna came 
across an odd letter in her mail. Opening it, she immediately saw in big, bold 
letters, “Cease and Desist.”  Suddenly, a lot of terrifying phrases were coming 
at her: copyright infringement, damages up to $150,000, and have your attorney 
contact us.  Scared, Anna looked up a local attorney and scheduled a meeting.  
The lawyer told her that while it was possible her fan fiction might constitute 
copyright infringement on the author’s exclusive derivative rights, it may also 
constitute fair use—which is an affirmative defense against a claim of copyright 
infringement.  However, he explained that proving fair use required defending 
her case in court.  While he thought Anna had a good case, the lawyer did not 
know if she would win, as there has never been a fan fiction case like it heard 
before the federal courts.  He also warned her that a trial could take up to two 
years, cost her several hundred thousand dollars in legal fees, and force her to 
pay double that number in damages should she lose.  Those figures were more 
money than Anna would make in the next five years of working and she barely 
had any free time as it was—certainly not enough time to spend in court.  
Defeated, Anna headed home, took down all her materials, and resigned herself 
to never writing fan fiction again.  All the while wondering, what if her works 
did constitute fair use? 
Currently, copyright law and the ability of creators to successfully rely on 
the flexible fair use standard is hindered by uncertainty.1  Looking at U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, describing the purpose of copyright, “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts,” it seems like copyright would be a 
straightforward system.2  The previous section explains the purpose and, 
directly following this phrase, there is a way to go about doing it: “by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”3  However, as copyright law has 
developed over the last century, the protections offered by it have expanded 
 
1.  John Tehranian, Whither Copyright? Transformative Use, Free Speech, and an Intermediate 
Liability Proposal, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1201, 1216–17 (2005). 
2.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
3.  Id.  
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from their simplistic origins of protecting solely against the direct reproduction 
of works.4  Currently, the promotion of progress is a balancing test that provides 
incentives and a shelter for creative works, but at the same time, limits these in 
both time and scope.5  The balancing test consists of weighing the exclusive 
rights of authors in their copyrighted works under 17 U.S.C. § 106 with the 
limitations on those exclusive rights under 17 U.S.C. § 107—or rather what § 
107 is more commonly known as, the fair use factors.6  However, there is an 
inherent paradox in that balancing test.7  17 U.S.C. § 106(2) provides protection 
to creators of derivative works, defining derivative as “any . . . form in which a 
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”8  This definition of derivative 
works became problematic in 1994, when the Supreme Court decided Campbell 
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., as 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) was expanded to include the 
degree that the work is transformative.9  The Court in Campbell stated 
“if [the original work] is . . . transformed in the creation of new 
information, new aesthetics, new insights, and understandings—this is 
the very type of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for 
the enrichment of society . . . The goal of copyright, to promote science 
and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative 
works.”10 
Therefore, while 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) and 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) seek opposite 
goals, courts apply them to the same subject, which is transformative works.11 
The paradox above has been left to the federal courts to sort out amongst 
themselves.12  Ideally, the courts would give the public a clear picture of their 
rights by hearing numerous copyright cases and gradually moving towards a 
workable balance of works classified as derivative and works that qualify for 
 
4.  MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 24 (5th ed. 2010). 
5.  Id. 
6.  Id. at 25.  
7.  Jacqueline D. Lipton & John Tehranian, Derivative Works 2.0: Reconsidering 
Transformative Use in the Age of Crowdsourced Creation, 109 NW. U.L. REV. 383, 384 (2015). 
8.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (defining a derivative work as “a work based upon one or more 
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion 
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in 
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”) (emphasis added). 
9.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
10.  Id. at 579 (emphasis added).  
11.  Id.  
12.  Mitch Stoltz, Collateral Damages: Why Congress Needs to Fix Copyright Law’s Civil 
Penalties, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (July 24, 2014), https://www.eff.org/wp/collateral-
damages-why-congress-needs-fix-copyright-laws-civil-penalties [https://perma.cc/M7S2-U6FL].  
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fair use treatment.13  By its nature, fair use is a flexible doctrine that is 
constantly developing through the interpretations of individual court cases.14  
However, the federal courts are failing to hear cases to completion and issue 
judicial opinions, which would provide the type of meaningful discourse 
necessary to provide authoritative certainty to copyright owners and users in 
the United States.15  Without some amount of certainty, the majority of creators 
are incapable of bringing copyright infringement claims or are too afraid to 
attempt to declare fair use, as such a claim can only be brought up as an 
affirmative defense in court.16  This situation ultimately chills the creation of 
new works because, upon notice of copyright infringement, creators are 
unwilling to assert fair use and instead often engage in acts of self-censorship, 
unnecessarily obtaining and paying for licenses they may legally not require, 
or they stop creating new works altogether.17 
Part I of this article will provide a brief background of the history and 
development of copyright law and fair use.  Specifically, Part I will discuss the 
reasoning behind the original exclusive rights provided to creators and how 
they were gradually extended to include derivative rights and fair use.18  This 
section begins by focusing on the utilitarian approach to copyright, which 
derives its basis from classical economic theory and inspired the writers of the 
Constitution.19  The section then continues with the historical development of 
fair use and how the transformative use paradigm has become the defining 
standard.20  Similar to the author’s exclusive rights, fair use is a concept that 
has been developing over time.21  It is only in the last twenty or so years that 
fair use has come to overtly and directly conflict with exclusive rights of 
copyright holders.22  With a better understanding of the origins of an author’s 
exclusive rights and fair use, we will hopefully proceed with a better 
understanding of how copyright law ended up in this paradoxical predicament. 
Part II explains how the current plan, leaving the paradox up to the federal 
 
13.  Id. 
14.  Id.  
15.  Id.  
16.  Ned Snow, Proving Fair Use: Burden of Proof as Burden of Speech, 31.5 CARDOZA L. 
REV. 1781, 1782–85 (2010).  
17.  Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VIRGINIA L. REV. 
1483, 1498 (2007). 
18.  Matthew Sag, The Prehistory of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1371, 1411 (2011).  
19.  Sara K. Stradler, Forging a Truly Utilitarian Copyright, 91 IOWA L. REV. 609, 611 (2006). 
20.  Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 719 
(2011).  
21.  Sag, supra note 18, at 1391. 
22.  Netanel, supra note 20, at 734; Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive 
Fallacy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 623, 647 (2012). 
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courts to sort out, is delaying any meaningful discourse on how anyone should 
interpret 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) and § 107(1) together.23  Specifically, this section 
will explain that the problem derives from federal courts being the one and only 
option in regards to the venue for copyright cases and that the majority of filed 
copyright cases are either not pursued or not litigated to completion.24  When 
people do not continue to litigate cases to their natural end, the courts are not 
creating any judicial policy, a necessity in developing the flexible fair use 
standard, leaving a chilling effect on the copyright environment.25  While there 
are several factors causing the failure of the public to litigate their claims, the 
issue is mainly that the courts are not a practical option for most parties.26  The 
federal courts require both an exorbitant amount of money and time to bring or 
defend claims.27  Additionally, federal judges often lack the specialized 
knowledge necessary to handle complex copyright claims, and the availability 
of statutory damages discourages people from pursuing defenses in court.28  
The combination of all of these factors has created an environment of fear 
coercing users into unnecessary licenses or settlements, effectively prohibiting 
certain uses without allowing the chance for fair use defenses to be made.29 
Part III proposes two hypotheses that Part IV will be reliant upon moving 
forward to a solution. These hypotheses include: (1) If statutory damages 
decrease, the incentive to file cases with the federal court will also decrease; 
and (2) if the cost/benefit of pursuing a case in federal court is too high, 
copyright owners will seek out alternative methods of enforcement. 
Finally, Part IV proposes a solution allowing for more fair use cases to 
result in a published judicial opinion, clarifying the paradox present in the 
current copyright statute and interpretation. This solution will consist of a two-
fold plan including: (1) reducing statutory damages in copyright cases that do 
not involve direct reproduction; and (2) creating a specialty court for small 
 
23.  Stoltz, supra note 12, at 8. 
24.  ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, Federal Judicial Caseload 
Statistics, tbl. C-4 (Mar. 31, 2015) http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/c04mar15_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QD6V-72RD]. 
25.  Steven Callander & Tom S. Clark, Precedent and Doctrine in a Complicated World, 
PUBLIC CHOICE SOC., 25–26 (2015), https://people.stanford.edu/sjc/sites/default/files/doctrine_marc
h2015_tc.pdf [https://perma.cc/NX5E-ZMTZ]. 
26.  Id.  
27.  Anthony Ciolli, Lowering the Stakes: Toward a Model of Effective Copyright Dispute 
Resolution, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 999, 1001–02 (2008). 
28.  Chad M. Oldfather, Judging, Expertise, and the Rule of Law, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 847, 
854–55 (2012); Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Boundaries of Intellectual Property 
Symposium: Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 439, 480 (2009). 
29.  James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE 
L. J. 882, 887–895 (2007). 
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claims copyright cases. 
Reducing statutory damages should likely decrease incentives for taking 
many cases to federal court, especially those with minimal or hard to determine 
actual damages.30  While this immediately seems counter to the goal of getting 
more fair use cases heard, the majority of the cases filed in federal court never 
end in a judicial opinion, causing continued uncertainty as discussed in part II.31  
Without cases resulting in judicial opinions, the federal courts are unable to 
assist in defining which transformative works qualify for protection and which 
transformative works should be allowed under the flexible standard that is fair 
use.32 
A new court offering a voluntary, simplified, less costly, and more 
expedient alternative to federal court would also attract more copyright cases.  
These new filings would include participation from both the wealthy, but newly 
dis-incentivized copyright owners, who no longer have a positive cost/benefit 
solution offered by the federal courts and amateur individuals/small enterprise 
creators who have never been able to practically afford to pursue the federal 
courts in the first place.33  Additionally, due to the lowered time and monetary 
investments necessary to pursue this court, it is much more likely that claims 
will continue to completion.34  While these judgments would not initially be 
binding on the federal courts, it would create judicial policy to be used as 
persuasive authority in the federal courts, similar to other specialty courts in the 
U.S., such as the U.S. Tax Court.35 
I.  DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT 
A. Origins of Copyright and the Economic Incentive Theory 
Even if copyright may just now be becoming an issue that concerns the 
majority of the public realm, it is itself not a new concept.36  Copyright law in 
the United States began back with the creation of the first U.S. Copyright Act 
of 1790, taken from Britain’s Copyright Act of 1709, the Statute of Anne.37  In 
these acts, authors are given the exclusive rights to print, reprint, publish, and 
 
30.  See discussion infra Part III (B). 
31.  See discussion infra Part II (A).  
32.  Stoltz, supra note 12, at 8.  
33.  Ciolli, supra note 27, at 1030–31.  
34.  Id.  
35.  Stoltz, supra note 12, at 8; Nina J. Crimm, Tax Controversies: Choice of Forum, 9 B.U. J. 
TAX L. 1, 74 (1991). 
36.  Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 
308 (1996). 
37.  Id. 
01 ZUERCHER.FINAL.FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2018  10:11 PM 
112 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 21:2 
 
distribute the works that they had created.38  These acts provide these 
protections because the founders and most people over the last several centuries 
believed in a utilitarian approach to the progress sought by U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 8.39  In particular, those who created these acts believed that the most 
effective way to accomplish progress was to give copyright owners protected 
economic incentives to create through the establishment of a limited monopoly 
over their works.40 
The utilitarian approach to copyright law derives from the classic economic 
idea that creators are assumed to be utility maximizers.41  In sum, this argument 
asserts that creators are rational actors and they can only be convinced to create 
if they can recoup the full economic value of their receipts, or rather their costs 
to create.42  Think of a song: If 10,000 people are willing to pay an artist an 
optimal price of $1 for a song (optimal representing the meeting point of the 
highest amount an individual is willing to pay and the lowest the creator is 
willing to sell), then the song has a value of $10,000. The argument then is that 
the creator will not make a song unless it can be produced at a cost less than 
$10,000. 
This theory develops from the same rationale as the free market theory.43  
In a free market, production of materials stems from the interaction of the 
maximum price buyers are willing to pay and the minimum price producers will 
sell.44  Simply, buyers must be willing to pay more for a good than it costs the 
seller to make the good.45  Take for example, a bike: If a bike costs $100 to 
make, based on both the materials and the cost of the labor and skill, and no 
one is willing to pay more than $50 for the bike, then a rational seller will not 
make the bike.46  However, the key difference here is tangible goods, like a 
bike, are often excludable and rivalrous,47 excludable meaning that a person can 
easily prevent others who have not paid for the good from being able to enjoy 
it, and rivalrous meaning that only one person at a time can use the good.48  
Thus, free market theory immediately poses a large problem for most 
 
38.  Copyright Act of 1790, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (15th ed. 2010). 
39.  Stadler, supra note 19, at 611.  
40.  Fred Rowley, Jr., Dynamic Copyright Law: Its Problems and a Possible Solution, 11 
HARV. J. L. & TEC. 481, 485 (1998).  
41.  Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
1569, 1573 (2009). 
42.  Rowley, supra note 40, at 485; Johnson, supra note 22, at 632.  
43.  Johnson, supra note 22, at 631. 
44.  Id. at 630. 
45.  Id.  
46.  Id. 
47.  Id. at 632. 
48.  Id. at 628. 
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copyrightable works because, as intangible goods, most copyright works are 
non-excludable and non-rivalrous.49  To use songs again as an example, this 
means that people can easily copy songs at a lower or sometimes nonexistent 
cost, and free-riders can listen to and enjoy the song at the same time as the 
buyer without ever needing to pay for it.50  Further, absent the implementation 
of outside consequences, it is almost impossible to stop people from doing so.51  
Therefore, without outside control, a creator could quite possibly only receive 
the optimal price—the $1 an individual is willing to pay for the song from the 
first person that buys it.52  The singular purchase results from the fact that a 
person can easily share the song, incurring no further cost, while still enjoying 
it themselves, and so others need not pay for the song themselves.53  When a 
good is copyable, with no repercussions, supply is not under the direct control 
of the creator, and reproduction of the good will drive the price people are 
willing to pay to zero, as there is an infinite supply of the good, thereby always 
exceeding demand.54  If  people cannot recoup the value of their works, they 
will simply not create the works.55 
Understandably the economics are confusing, but the sum principle of the 
utilitarian argument often falls back to its seemingly self-explanatory nature.56  
Specifically, why would someone spend time and effort creating something of 
value if everyone can enjoy that value without giving anything for it in return, 
or as Samuel Johnson once eloquently put it, “No man but a blockhead ever 
wrote except for money.”57  Therefore, to correct for the non-excludable, non-
rivalrous nature of intangible works, copyright laws and protections are put into 
place to create a de facto excludable and rivalrous nature to the goods.58  The 
utilitarian argument then asserts that the more of these laws and protections that 
are in place, the better the chances a creator will be able to recover their costs.59  
The easier it is for creators to recover their costs, the more incentive they will 
 
49.  David W. Barnes, Congestible Intellectual Property and Impure Public Goods, 9 NW. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 533, 533–4 (2011); Jeanne Fromer, Should the Law Care Why Intellectual 
Property Rights Have Been Asserted?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 549, 554 (2015). 
50.  Barnes, supra note 49, at 533–4. 
51.  Id.  
52.  Johnson, supra note 22, at 633. 
53.  Id. 
54.  Eric E. Johnson, The Economics and Sociality of Sharing Intellectual Property Rights, 94 
B.U. L. REV. 1935, 1941 (2014). 
55.  Rowley, supra note 40, at 485.  
56.  Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, supra note 22, at 629. 
57.  Id.; JAMES BOSWELL, LIFE OF JOHNSON Vol. 6 (of 6): George Birbeck Hill, ed., 2004).  
58.  Johnson, supra note 54, at 1940.  
59.  Johnson, supra note 22, at 633–34. 
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have to create new works.60 
To promote these utilitarian goals and to provide greater economic 
incentives of creators, copyright was continually expanded from its original 
form—protecting only against direct reproduction—to also including other 
exclusive rights, such as the Copyright Act of 1906 additions—protecting 
“other versions and adaptions the work might take.”61  While the actual 
inclusion of the general phrase, “derivative works” was not added until 1976 as 
a part of 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), the addition of the 1906 protections are commonly 
thought of as the precursor to the derivative right.62  Regardless, the protection 
of derivative works now entails protection of 
A work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a 
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, 
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, 
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, 
transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, 
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, 
represent an original work of authorship, is a ‘derivative work.63 
While this definition of the derivative work right is largely uncontroversial 
in cases involving the nine examples of derivatives listed within the definition, 
it has proved highly problematic in cases where the court is required to decide 
where the definition ends.64  Uncertainty occurs because some courts and 
commentators have interpreted “any other form in which the work is recast, 
transformed, or adapted” to mean that copyright owners are entitled to control 
 
60.  Id.  
61.  Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (1909) (repealed 1976); Fromer, supra note 49, 
at 554; See generally 122 Cong. Rec. 2834 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1976) (statement of Sen. McClellan 
discussing the necessity of expanded protections of the 1976 Copyright Act as “applying the standard 
of what best promotes the constitutional mandate to encourage and reward authorship”); Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 
201, 209 (1954) (describing the framers intent and the continued economic philosophy behind 
Copyright: “encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public 
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in “science and useful Arts.”)); Copyright Term, 
Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and 
Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 2 (1995) (statement by Rep. 
Moorhead, subcomm. Chairman summarizing the main justifications for expanding the protections of 
Copyright are “fairness and economics”); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 186 (2003) (providing 
greater economic incentives for authors established a rational basis for enacting the CTEA). 
62.  Daniel Gervais, The Derivative Right, or Why Copyright Law Protects Foxes Better than 
Hedgehogs, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH L. 785, 793 (2013).  
63.  17 U.S.C. §101 (1976) (describing the definition of derivative works). 
64.  Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright’s Derivative Work 
Right, 101 GEO. L. J. 1505, 1509 (2013). 
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all markets into which any perceptible piece of their work might appear.65  In 
the current day, such an interpretation leads directly to a paradox when making 
a claim of fair use, as will be illustrated below in Part B.66 
B. Development of Fair Use 
Fair use did not appear in codified statute until the Copyright Act of 1976, 
but it can date its entry into the legal realm much further back than most would 
assume.67  Fair use in copyright began as common law policy, whose basic 
precepts can be traced back to English common law judges attempting to parse 
out the extent of protection that was to be offered by the Copyright Act of 1710, 
the Statute of Anne.68  In the years that followed the statute’s inception, judges 
began to allow many of the quintessential fair uses we recognize today, such as 
quotes and critiques.69  These exceptions find their basis in the reasoning 
summarized best by Lord Ellenborough in Cary v. Kearsley, 4 Esp. 168 (1803). 
That part of a work of one author is found in another, is not itself piracy, 
or sufficient to support an action; a man may fairly adopt part of the 
work of another; he may so make use of another’s labours for the 
promotion of science, and the benefit of the public . . . While I shall 
think myself bound to secure in every man the enjoyment of his 
copyright, one must not put manacles on science.70 
However, even back then, the courts realized that these types of decisions 
could not be made with bright line rules, but simply through gradual 
interpretation on a case-by-case analysis.71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65.  PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 5.3.1 (3d ed. 2005); Zechariah Chafee, 
Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 505 (1945) (“The essential principle 
is the author’s right to control all the channels through which his work or any fragments of his work 
reach the market.”); see e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 140 
(2d Cir. 1998). 
66.  Sag, supra note 18, at 1411.  
67.  Id. at 1390; Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, supra note 20, at 719. 
68.  Sag, supra note 18, at 1391. 
69.  Id.  
70.  BRIAN FITZGERALD & JOHN GILCHRIST, COPYRIGHT PERSPECTIVES: PAST PRESENT AND 
PROSPECT 132 (2015) (quoting Cary v. Kearsley, 4 Esp. 168, 169 (1803)). 
71.  Sag, supra note 18, at 1393. 
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Eventually, in Folsom v. Marsh, the Court acknowledged the importance of 
being able to make use of another’s labours and set out the opinion that 
we must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the nature and 
objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials 
used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or 
diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.72 
While it did then operate as common law, this opinion and these factors 
were put into the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107.73 
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is 
a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—  
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use 
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 
the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.74 
Upon its introduction into 17 U.S.C. § 107, and for the next several decades 
after, the courts in practice used fair use much differently than it is used today.75  
Still believing strongly in the strength of economic incentives, fair use was 
applied most often through the lens of the market-centered paradigm.76  The 
market-centered paradigm posited that of the four factors, the fourth factor, 
“effect of the use on the potential market or value of the copyrighted work[,]” 
was the most important factor.77  Barton Beebe conducted an empirical study 
of fair use cases between 1978 and 2005 to study this effect and found that, of 
the 141 opinions that found the fourth factor disfavored fair use, all but one 
opinion found no fair use.78 
 
72.  Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105–6 (1990) 
(quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. CAS. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)).  
73.  Yafit Lev-Aretz, Subtle Incentive Theory of Copyright Licensing, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1357, 
1390 (2015).  
74.  17 U.S.C. §107 (1976). 
75.  Yafit Lev-Aretz, supra note 73, at 1392. 
76.  Netanel, supra note 20, at 734. 
77.  Id.; See e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters, 471 U.S. 539, 558–59 
(1985). 
78.  Netanel, supra note 20, at 724.  
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However, over the last ten years, the idea that copyright should be majorly 
concerned with allowing creators to protect their economic incentives is being 
heavily questioned.79  Many scholars now assert that copyright was never meant 
to be about protecting the creator first.80  Diane Zimmerman summarized this 
point in a recent article, stating “the idea that for copyright to be any kind of 
useful incentive, it must offer the prospect of a larger and larger pot of gold 
through more control spread out over longer and longer times seems simply 
disconnected from what is really going on in the creative sphere.”81  The sole 
goal of copyright is to stimulate activity.82  Providing economic incentives to 
creators was just the means to an end, not the goal, and we should be adjusting 
our process as new and better ways of stimulating activity are found.83 
Indeed, as the digital economy has advanced, and the costs of participation 
in creativity have lowered, a new trend has become increasingly clear.84  
Creators are no longer just people wishing to make money, but can also be 
people who are intrinsically motivated and who often want to create and 
participate in current culture without thought of monetary reward.85  Instead of 
economic rewards, these creators find motivation in positive feedback, 
gratitude, and critiques about their contributions.86 Fan fiction writers are the 
perfect example of the type of people who create solely from these intrinsic 
motivations.87  Despite having no readily accessible ability to derive income 
from creating a work of fan fiction, thousands of amateur authors spend their 
time and efforts creating these works every day.88  Further, research has now 
supported that economic incentives can sometimes be detrimental to creativity 
derived from these intrinsic sources  In a meta-analysis of 128 experiments on 
reward effects, it was found that tangible rewards, such as money, tend to have 
a substantially negative effect on intrinsic motivations, decreasing creativity.89  
 
79.   Johnson, supra note 22, at 647. 
80.   Id.  
81.   Id.; Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 
12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW, 29, 57 (2011). 
82.   Leval, supra note 72, at 1107. 
83.   Id.  
84.   Id. 
85.   Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, supra note 22, at 647. 
86.  DANIEL H. PINK, DRIVE: THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT WHAT MOTIVATES US 37 
(2009) (citing Edward L. Deci et al., Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motivation in Education: 
Reconsidered Once Again, 71 REV. EDU. RES. 14 (2001)).  
87.   Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 513, 528–32 (2009). 
88.   Id.  
89.  Edward L. Deci, Richard Koestner, & Richard M. Ryan, A Meta- Analytic Review of 
Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
627, 658–59 (1999). 
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The negative effect occurs because people, who were once intrinsically 
motivated, tend to lose their drive and desire once they receive monetary 
rewards.90  The activity becomes only about receiving the money—turning 
interesting tasks into dull and laborious work.91 
Recognizing economic incentives are not always effective in promoting 
“the Progress of Science and the useful Arts[,]” and that there are other sources 
for creativity, the courts have undergone a major doctrinal shift from the 
Market-Centered paradigm, focusing on factors protecting the creator’s 
economic incentives to the Transformative Use paradigm.92  Under this new 
paradigm, while the factors should all receive consideration, the key is arguably 
just whether the defendant uses the work in a transformative manner, or 
whether the use promotes a further purpose or different character.93  This shift 
is confirmed in Neil Natanel’s empirical study of seventy-nine published 
opinions concerning claims of fair use, occurring from 2006 to 2010.94  Out of 
the sixty-eight unique cases, it was found that defendants won hundred percent 
of the time when a district court found a use to be unequivocally transformative, 
regardless of the findings of other factors.95 
Immediately, it is noticeable that the statutory test for fair use, contained 
within 17 U.S.C. § 107, does not mention the transformative nature of a use.  
The identification of ‘transformative’ as a necessary consideration for weight 
was only included within § 107(1) when the Supreme Court issued its opinion 
for Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. in 1994.96  In an earlier case, the Second 
Circuit declared that “the ultimate test of fair use  . . . is whether the copyright 
law’s goal of promoting the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . would be 
better served by allowing the use than by preventing it.”97  Specifically, 
“whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of the original creation, 
or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, 
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message[,] . . . in other 
words, whether and to what extent the new work is transformative.”98 
 
90.  EDWARD L. DECI & RICHARD FLASTE, WHY WE DO WHAT WE DO: THE DYNAMICS OF 
PERSONAL AUTONOMY, 29 (1995). 
91.  Id. 
92.  Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, supra note 20, at 734.   
93.  Id. at 735–36.  
94.  Id. at 731. 
95.  Id. at 755.  
96.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
97.  Arica Inst., v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1077 (1992). 
98.  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580.  
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C. Derivative Use/Transformative Use Paradox 
17 U.S.C. § 106(2) provides copyright protection to creators in their 
derivative works while 17 U.S.C. § 107(1), examining the purpose and 
character of a use, has come to mean that the more transformative a use the 
more likely it will fall within the fair use exception.99  A derivative work, by 
statutory definition, is a “work based upon one or more preexisting works, such 
as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion 
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, 
or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”100 
Consequently, there is both an exclusive right and an exception based on the 
transformative nature of a work.101  Courts are now finding fair use based on 
the transformative nature of a work, but because of the paradox above, it is still 
unclear what kind of works are transformative under 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), and 
what works are transformative under 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).102 Justice Easterbrook 
critiqued this exact issue in Kientz v. Sconnie Nation, LLC, stating: 
To say that a new use transforms the work is precisely to say that it is 
derivative and thus, one might suppose, protected under § 106(2). 
Cariou and its predecessors in the Second Circuit do no explain how 
every “transformative use” can be “fair use” without extinguishing the 
author’s rights under § 106(2).103 
It seems like the easiest approach to the problem would be to get rid of one 
of these sections, but this solution seems to be a poor one.104  While it seems 
the majority of the legal scholarship is moving toward allowing more uses 
under the fair use exception, most scholars still also acknowledge that economic 
incentives, such as the ability to receive economic gains from some derivative 
works, are useful to a degree.105  The usefulness is particularly true in cases 
where the creative labor is not being engaged in by an individual, but a 
corporation, which may not subscribe to intrinsic motivators, as the focus is 
often monetary.106 Additionally, it is certain that currently some societally 
valuable works, such as large-scale cinematic productions with budgets 
upwards of $100,000,000 or more, would simply not exist without economic 
 
99.  Id. 
100.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (describing the definition of a derivative work). 
101.  Lipton & Tehranian, supra note 7, at 384. 
102.  Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, supra note 20, at 750–51. 
103.  Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation, LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014). 
104.  Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, supra note 22, at 661. 
105.  Id. 
106.  Id.  
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incentives.107  Therefore, copyright law must both provide adequate economic 
incentives to produce and disseminate some creative works—as many creative 
works do still cost money, but also limit these protections in other cases to allow 
for intrinsic motivating factors to result in the creation of new works as well.108  
To provide a workable balance, we need to publish judicial opinions, creating 
judicial policy with regards to the types of transformative works we should 
protect under derivative works and the types of transformative works that we 
should be allow as fair use. 
II. THE STATUS QUO 
Currently, all interpretation of copyright law and fair use has been left up 
to the federal court system.109  Historically, copyright developed on a mix of 
federal and state laws, but Congress’s creation of the Copyright Act of 1976 
provided exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts in all cases of copyright 
infringement.110  Exclusive jurisdiction was granted to the federal courts 
because copyright law is federal law and Congress hoped to ensure both 
consistency of decisions and the quality of those decisions, as the decision 
making by judges in federal courts is considered more reliable and possessing 
higher degrees of expertise than is found in the state courts.111  However, the 
fact that copyright is limited to the federal courts is effectively creating a 
roadblock to interpreting copyright law and the fair use doctrine.112  
Specifically, the roadblocks consist of the cost and time associated with 
claiming copyright infringement and the potential damages that may result 
from attempting to defend yourself under the fair use doctrine.113  These 
roadblocks are detrimental for creators in copyright because it has made it 
difficult for both copyright owners to enforce their exclusive rights and for 
copyright users to defend themselves through fair use.114  Ideally, the federal 
courts are supposed to hear cases and issue opinions, creating judicial policy on 
what society has decided the proper balance should be between what is 
considered a protected work and what should be allowed as fair use.  However, 
 
107.  Id. 
108.  Id.  
109.  Ciolli, supra note 27, at 1001; Virginia Knapp Dorell, Recent Development: Picturing a 
Remedy for Small Claims of Copyright Infringement, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 449, 454 (2013).  
110.  Ciolli, supra note 27, at 1001–2.  
111.  Statement of the United States Copyright Office before the Subcommittee on Courts, the 
Internet, and Intellectual Property, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives 
109th Congress, 2nd Session (Mar. 29, 2006). 
112.  Tehranian, supra note 1, at 1216–17. 
113.  Id. 
114.  Jeffrey Bils, David’s Sling: How to Give Copyright Owners a Practical Way to Pursue 
Small Claims, 62 UCLA L. REV. 464, 469 (2015). 
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the current federal court system is clearly ill-equipped to provide this service.115 
A.  Number of Cases: 
In the 175 years since the first fair use argument in Folsom v. Marsh, there 
have been less than 900 fair use cases that have resulted in a reported opinion 
issued by the federal courts.116  Admittedly, the majority of those cases 
appeared in the last forty years, but even in 2015, there were only ten total 
copyright infringement cases involving a claim of fair use that resulted in a 
reported judicial opinion from the federal courts.117  A direct cause of this lack 
of opinions is simply that copyright infringement cases do not often make it to 
court or terminate prematurely— and without infringement cases, there are no 
fair use cases. While people filed 4,680 copyright infringement cases in 2015, 
4,253 of those copyright cases terminated that same year.118  Of these 4,253 
cases, 1,574 resulted in no court action taken, and another 2,295 terminated 
before a pretrial hearing.119  Taking even a low estimate of 2.3% of copyright 
cases involving a claim of fair use, which is the ten fair use cases resulting out 
of the 427 copyright cases not terminated in 2015, the 4,253 terminated 
copyright cases likely represent at least 98 never heard fair use cases. 
Theoretically, it could be possible that the 900 published cases could be 
enough for the courts to clearly determine which works we should protect under 
exclusive derivative rights and which works we should protect under claims of 
fair use, but this is not realistic.120  Entire areas of works such as fan fiction, 
appropriation art, and even remixing videos on YouTube are still in an entirely 
gray area within the legal realm despite their relatively common use in 
society.121  In fact, there has not been a single published opinion regarding fan 
fiction fair use,122 only five published opinions regarding appropriation art fair 
 
115.   Stoltz, supra note 12, at 8.  
116.  Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841); Published Cases Involving 
Copyright Fair Use, LEXISNEXIS, http://advance.lexis.com/usersearchhome; search “Fair Use AND 
Copyright Infringement,” follow Cases hyperlink, then narrow by “Reported,” “Federal,” and “Jan. 1, 
1869–Dec. 31, 2015.”  
117.  Published Cases Involving Copyright Fair Use, LEXISNEXIS, 
http://advance.lexis.com/usersearchhome; search “Fair Use AND Copyright Infringement,” follow 
Cases hyperlink, then narrow by “Reported,” “Federal,” and “Jan.1 2015–Dec. 31, 2015.” 
118.   Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, supra note 24. 
119.   Id.  
120.   Ciolli, supra note 27, at 1009. 
121.   Lipton & Tehranian, supra note 7, at 386–388.  
122.   Published Cases Involving Fair Use Fan Fiction, LEXISNEXIS, 
http://advance.lexis.com/usersearchhome; search “Fan Fiction AND Fair Use AND Copyright 
Infringement,” follow Cases hyperlink, then narrow by “Reported,” “Federal,” and “1869–2015.” 
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use,123 and only five published opinions on video remixing fair use.124  Each 
and every one of these cases are being viewed with caution, as they all have 
been subject to negative treatments by other districts.125 
A lack of cases is problematic for fair use because fair use is a flexible 
standard.126  Flexible standards involve interpretation through the resolution of 
individual cases, which create judicial opinions regarding specific factual 
circumstances, which in turn then create judicial policy for those circumstances 
within the standard.127  Congress does not often enact perfectly specified 
legislation, and statutes are often purposefully left vague to some degree to 
allow for later interpretation over issues Congress could not agree on 
themselves, or simply because bright line rules would create problematic 
consequences for later unseen technological or legal developments.128  In 
common law legal systems, such as the United States, there is a strong 
connection between distinct factual circumstances and effective practice of 
legal rules; precedent, the principle often used to determine individual cases, 
requires that rules be applied consistently in factually similar cases.129  When 
there are relatively few factually similar cases on a subject, uncertainty occurs 
because judges can dispute the relevance of previous decisions for ruling on 
new cases based on the factual distinctions.130  A similar problem was behind 
the creation of lower courts in the first place, as they were supposed to act 
almost as laboratories for the cases—hearing and experimenting with all sorts 
of factual scenarios and creating judicial policy, which could then be taken up 
by the higher courts and become binding.131  Unfortunately, lower courts  are 
unable to do this job, as the federal courts do not hear cases often enough to 
perform it.132  Therefore, it is necessary to come up with an alternative solution, 
which would allow the courts to issue judicial opinions on more factual 
 
123.  Published Cases Involving Appropriation Art and Fair Use, LEXISNEXIS, 
http://advance.lexis.com/usersearchhome; search “Appropriation Art AND Fair Use AND Copyright 
Infringement,” follow Cases hyperlink, then narrow by “Reported,” “Federal,” and “1869–2015.” 
124.  Published Cases Involving Video Remixing and Fair Use, LEXISNEXIS, 
http://advance.lexis.com/usersearchhome; search “Video AND Remix AND Fair Use AND Copyright 
Infringement”, follow Cases hyperlink, then narrow by “Reported”, “Federal”, and “1869–2015”. 
125.  See notes 122–124 (LexisNexis offers a notification when a case has been negatively 
treated by another court). 
126.  Callander & Clark, supra note 25, at 25. 
127.  Id.; Stoltz, supra note 12, at 8. 
128.  Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 786 (2011). 
129.  Peter G. Stein, Roman Law, Common Law, and Civil Law, 66 TULANE L. REV. 1591, 
1594 (1992); Callander & Clark, supra note 25, at 1. 
130.  Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, supra note 20, at 729–730.  
131.  Id. 
132.  Lipton & Tehranian, supra note 7, at 386–388. 
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scenarios—which would inexorably decrease total uncertainty.133 
B. Costs 
The second factor causing cases either a lack of filing or early termination 
of a suit is cost. Per the most recent AILPA Report of the Economic Survey 
2015, the typical costs of a copyright infringement case range anywhere from 
$250,000 to as much $1.2 million dollars.134  While the claims discussed in this 
article are more likely to be on the lower part of that spectrum, that is still an 
exorbitant amount of money for the average creator, as the median household 
income in the U.S. for an entire year, $51,939, does not even begin to approach 
covering it.135 
Further, it is important to acknowledge that the costs of litigation tend to be 
almost the same for the defendant.136  Thus, even when a person successfully 
brings a case of copyright infringement, it can still fail to proceed to a judicial 
opinion because the defendant cannot afford the costs of pursuing a claim of 
fair use.137  In general, the majority of copyright users when threatened with 
copyright infringement will immediately cease disseminating their work, settle, 
obtain a license that is completely unnecessary, or not bother creating further 
works at all, even when they might have an extremely good case for fair use.138 
C. Time 
The third factor of concern is the amount of time it takes to process a 
copyright infringement claim in the federal courts.  A civil case that goes 
through the federal court system has a median time of twenty-five months.139  
The foremost of the factors causing this delay is case backlog.140  Currently, in 
the US federal court system, there is a backlog of more than 340,000 pending 
civil cases.141  Additionally, this number does not reflect that the federal courts 
 
133.  Tom S. Clark & Jonathan P. Kastellec, The Supreme Court and Percolation in the Lower 
Courts: An Optimal Stopping Model, 75(1) J. OF POLITICS 150, 152 (2013).  
134.  Richard W. Goldstein & Donika P. Pentcheva, Report of the Economic Survey, AM. 
INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, 39 (2015) http://files.ctctcdn.com/e79ee274201/b6ced6c3-d1ee-4ee7-9873-
352dbe08d8fd.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3US-8P8T]. 
135.  Balganesh, Shyamkrishna, Copyright Infringement Markets, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2277, 
2280 (2013). 
136.  Goldstein & Pentcheva, supra note 134, at 47.  
137.  Gibson, supra note 29, at 887–895.  
138.  Id.  
139.  Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, supra note 24. 
140.  Rowley, supra note 40, at 523.  
141. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, Federal Judicial Caseload 
Statistics, C series (Mar. 31, 2015) http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-
caseload-statistics-2015-tables. 
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must attempt to resolve criminal matters before they address civil ones in 
circumstances where it is reasonable to do so, and the number of backlogged 
criminal cases is over 80,000.142  While the nature of criminal cases can make 
the delay seem justifiable, it does not change the fact that copyright gets put on 
a backburner and “if decisions on contracts, mergers and intellectual-property 
rights can’t be reached through quick and prompt justice, things unravel for 
business.”143  This kind of time investment is not feasible for the average 
individual or amateur creator.144  Judge Lawrence J. O’Neill spoke on this issue 
stating “[o]ver the years I’ve received several letters from people indicating, 
‘Even if I win this case now, my business has failed because of the delay. How 
is this justice?’ And the simple answer, which I cannot give them, is this: It is 
not justice. We know it.”145 
D. Statutory Damages 
Finally, the last factor affecting early termination of copyright suits or a 
causing the suit never to occur is the excessive damages available to those 
making claims of infringement.  Under the current copyright regime, 17 U.S.C. 
§ 504 allows statutory damages awards in amounts up to $150,000 per work 
infringed with no necessity to show evidence of harm.146  While § 504 does 
leave the determination of damages up to the discretion of the court, the courts 
have had a history of awarding large statutory damages well in excess of any 
actual damages.147  These high statutory damages have occurred even in cases 
where actual damage is minimal, and users had attempted to comply with the 
law in good faith.148  In the current statutory regime, there is always the 
possibility that a court could make any given individual, such as those who have 
in good faith attempted to create some new transformative work by remixing a 
bunch of videos, songs, or pictures, liable for anything from a couple hundred 
 
142.  John Conyers, Jr., Class Action “Fairness”: A Bad Deal for the States and Consumers, 40 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 493, 506 (2003); ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 
Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, D series (Mar. 31, 2015) http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-
reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2015-tables. 
143.  Joe Palazzolo, Glut of Criminal Cases Puts the Squeeze on Civil Litigation, WALL ST. J. 
BLOG (Nov. 10, 2011) (quoting Judge W. Royal Furgeson). 
144.  Notice, Remedies for Small Copyright Claims, 76 Fed. Reg. at 66,758 (Oct. 27, 2011).  
145.  Joe Palazzolo, In Federal Courts, the Civil Cases Pile Up, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 6, 2015) 
(quoting Judge Lawrence J. O’Neill). 
146.  17 U.S.C. § 504 (1976) (describing the definition, allowances, and requirements of 
pursuing statutory damages). 
147.  Tehranian, supra note 1, at 1206. 
148.  Id.; See e.g., L.A. Times, Inc. v. Free Republic, No. CV 98-7840 MMM (AJWx), 2000 
WL 565200, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2000). 
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dollars to millions of dollars for the singular, newly created work.149  These 
possible damages effectively throw aside the safeguards Congress and the 
courts have created, as companies and copyright trolls can often threaten and 
coerce settlements of thousands of dollars out of confused, unsure, and terrified 
users who have in fact likely done little wrong.150  The result being that 
copyright cases are often never heard in a meaningful way that allows for the 
creation of judicial opinion and precedent.151 
E. Practical Assessment 
Overall, these factors all have an incredibly detrimental effect on the ability 
of the federal courts to issue judicial opinions.  The lack of judicial opinions 
stops courts from providing guidance and interpreting the inherent paradox of 
exclusive derivative rights of the copyright owner under 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), 
and the ability for new works to be created under the protection of 17 U.S.C. § 
107.  Fair use is a purposefully flexible doctrine, but this paradox has 
consistently produced inconsistent and unclear results for the few cases that 
have been heard, leaving creators, both amateur and professional, without any 
real idea of what uses constitute fair use or copyright infringement.152  As the 
digital age advances and the opportunity to create and disseminate works 
becomes easier and more accessible, this hindrance will only stagnate the 
creation of new copyright works, going against the inherent purpose of 
copyright law, which the creation of new works furthers.153 
F. Status Quo in the United Kingdom: IPEC Analysis 
Faced with similar problems as those discussed above, such as costly and 
timely litigation, other countries around the world have been implementing new 
programs and restructuring their courts in attempts to correct for these 
problems.154  In particular, the United Kingdom created several new smaller 
 
149.  Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1194, 1196 (2010). 
150.  Stoltz, supra note 12, at 7.  
151.  Id.  
152.  Lipton & Tehranian, supra note 7, at 388–89. Compare Fitzgerald v. CBS Broad., Inc. 
491 F. Supp. 2d 177 (where the photograph used in News Story was not Fair Use), with Harris v. San 
Jose Mercury News, No. C 04-05262 CRB. (N.D. Cal. Feb 03, 2006) (where the parties settled after 
no Fair Use found for use of a Photograph in News Story).  
153.  Lipton & Tehranian, supra note 7, at 443; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 
(1994). 
154.  MARIA PALLANTE, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT SMALL CLAIMS: A REPORT OF 
THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS (2013) https://www.copyright.gov/docs/smallclaims/usco-
smallcopyrightclaims.pdf [https://perma.cc/DQ4M-HFZS]; CHRISTIAN HELMERS, YASSINE 
LEFOUILI, & LUKE MCDONAGH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE [IPO], EVALUATION OF THE 
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and multi-level accelerated tracks at IPEC (Intellectual Property Enterprise 
Court), receiving critical acclaim.155  Before the court began restructuring in 
2010, IPEC had already been operating as a specialty court, known then as the 
PCC (Patents County Court), hearing patent, copyright, and other intellectual 
property cases.  However, in the court’s original form, it offered little 
procedural distinction from the more generalist High Court and heard only a 
few cases per year, usually less than thirty.156  Upon further research 
surrounding the time and high costs associated with hearing claims, a recent 
independent report on IPEC found these to be incredibly detrimental to small 
and medium enterprises bringing their claims.157  To address these problems, 
reforms were initiated in 2010 to improve access and provide a cost effective 
forum for small and medium enterprises, as well as larger enterprises with 
smaller matters, to resolve their IP disputes.158  These reforms largely consisted 
of changes relaxing procedure, introducing damage caps, and creating pro-
active case management, allowing early identification of issues by judges, and 
better allowing for pro se representation.159  For example, judges now conduct 
limited pre-trial conferences, held by telephone or video conference, which 
directly lay out the issues the parties should address during a hearing and the 
evidence that will be required to support them.160 
Following the fourth year after initiating reforms, IPEC reported a 353% 
increase in the number of copyright cases that it hears per year.161  While the 
effect only represents a 15% increase in the total number of all the copyright 
cases filed in the UK, as copyright cases still come before the High Court, it is 
still not insignificant.162  It is also of note that 90% of the litigants that accounted 
for that increase were small to medium enterprises and individuals.163 
Additionally, while representing just 10% of the claimants, it shows that even 
some large companies have found it preferable to file claims using the 
accelerated IPEC tracks rather than the pursue the High Court, resulting in an 
overall increase in the number of intellectual property disputes heard.164  Judges 
and solicitors in the field assert that clients are simply feeling more confident 
 
REFORMS OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENTERPRISE COURT 2010-2013 (June 22,2015); ANGELA 
FOX, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENTERPRISE COURT: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1 (2015). 
155.  HELMERS ET AL., supra note 154, at 2.  
156.  Id. at 4.  
157.  Id. 4–5; FOX, supra note 154, at 4. 
158.  HELMERS ET AL., supra note 154, at 4–6.  
159.  Id. 
160.  Id. at 8–9.  
161.  Id. at 17.  
162.  Id. 
163.  Id. 
164.  Id. at 25.  
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about both bringing claims and defending their claims in court since the 
reforms.165  A recent independent report on IPEC suggests that the likely cause 
of this confidence is the cost cap changes and the increased speed of litigation, 
as these provide the benefit of letting litigants have a better idea of the potential 
costs and exposure they open themselves up to in the courts.166 
Unfortunately, there has not been any empirical research done on the effect 
IPEC has had directly on the development of Intellectual Property Law and 
judicial policy in the United Kingdom.  However, the reforms represent a 
positive outlook for pursuing alternative solutions to increase access to the 
courts, which directly results in the resolution of more individual cases. 
III. HYPOTHESES 
Before continuing into the part IV, which will present the proposed 
solutions to correct the problems with status quo discussed above, it is 
necessary to acknowledge that section IV proceeds from two hypotheses. These 
hypotheses are that 1) reducing statutory damages will decrease the incentive 
to file cases with the Federal Court; and 2) If the cost/benefit of pursuing a case 
in federal court is too high, copyright owners will look for alternative methods 
of enforcement. 
A. If Statutory Damages Were Reduced, the Incentive to File Cases with the 
Federal Court Would Also Be Reduced 
Statutory damages were originally introduced into various fields of law as 
a mechanism to increase incentives to litigate, as damages sometimes do not 
exceed the costs of litigation.167  This theory has proved to be true across 
various fields of law with the introduction of statutory and punitive damages, 
resulting in filing rates in some areas that are ten and even a hundred times than 
previous numbers.168  In civil litigation, this is explained by the commonly 
accepted idea that a plaintiff will bring a case to court only if the result would 
equal or exceed the costs of pursuing the claim.169  In federal court, as the costs 
can be incredibly high, statutory damages are seen as especially necessary for 
this reason.170  Therefore, basic logic would suggest that if incentives are 
lowered again, fewer plaintiffs will seek the federal courts to hear their claims 
 
165.  Id. at 7.  
166.  Id. at 34.  
167.  Lemos, supra note 128, at 792; Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense 
Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 61 (2005).  
168.  Lemos, supra note 128, at 802.  
169.  Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative 
Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 58 (1982).  
170.  Lemos, supra note 128, at 790.  
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because few copyright cases would result in a positive cost/benefit scenario. 
Immediately this seems counter to the goal of this article, which is to get 
more copyright cases heard.  However, the distinction that is important to make 
here is that while there is universally agreeance that increased economic 
incentives in the form of higher damages increase the number of copyright 
cases filed, it also arguably decreases the number of cases that result in a 
judicial opinion.171  The lack of judicial opinions is incredibly problematic for 
fair use cases because, without judicial opinion, new accepted fair uses can 
arguably not be created with any certainty.172 
B. If the Cost/Benefit of Pursuing a Case in Federal Court is Too High, 
Copyright Owners Will Look for Alternative Methods of Enforcement 
Currently, an overwhelming majority of copyright cases do not have a 
positive cost/benefit ratio for creators to pursue.173 In practice, this has caused 
creators to avoid pursuing the federal courts at all, leaving them without a 
practical method of enforcement, and cries for change have ensued.174  
Specifically, there have already been calls for affordable and timely processes 
to assert copyright infringement by many organizations in America who 
represent both individual and small business creators, such as the Professional 
Photographers of America and the Author’s Guild.175 The latter, being 
America’s oldest and largest professional organization for writers, even polled 
the organization’s members to find that a majority favored the creation of some 
new type of small claims process for copyright infringement, as they felt a 
practical remedy was not available to them.176 
IV.  AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE STATUS QUO: REDUCED STATUTORY 
DAMAGES & SMALL CLAIMS COPYRIGHT COURT 
While the United States Copyright Office proposed a small claims court 
system in 2013, following the creation of several other such copyright 
expedient measures in court systems around the globe such as the UK, the time 
is now ripe to act on it, and this proposal mirrors much of the 2013 proposal.177  
By creating small claims copyright court, the courts will not only address the 
shortcomings of the federal courts, but they will also create opportunities to 
 
171.  Stoltz, supra note 12, at 8; Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright 
Trolls, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 723, 741–2 (2013). 
172.  Stoltz, supra note 12, at 8.  
173.  Dorell, supra note 109, at 456.  
174.  Id. at 457.  
175.  Id.  
176.  Id. 
177.  PALLANTE, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 154.  
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clarify an unclear fair use standard.  With this in mind, we propose a two-fold 
approach including: (1) reducing the maximum statutory damages allowed for 
cases that do not deal with direct reproduction, and (2) creating a specialty small 
claims courts that deal only with copyright. 
A.  Reduced Statutory Damages 
The reduction of statutory damages should occur in both the federal court 
and the specialty court for cases that do not involve direct reproduction for two 
reasons.  First, statutory damages have created a culture of fear that has 
effectively turned just their possibility into a club that is used to beat settlements 
out of copyright users who may not even be infringing copyright.178  Secondly, 
the goal of getting more copyright infringement cases heard would be advanced 
if wealthier plaintiffs were disincentivized from filing claims in federal court 
when damages are relatively minimal, and instead encouraged to pursue 
alternative venues. 
In addressing the culture of fear, statutory damages were never meant to 
serve the sole purpose of acting as the ultimate deterrence against all forms of 
potential copyright infringement.179  Congress originally intended for statutory 
damages to be compensatory in instances where damages could not be readily 
obtained, with a modest level of deterrence as a secondary consideration.180  
Further, the amount of deterrence necessary from the tripartite structure of 17 
U.S.C. § 504 was supposed to operate on separate levels of infringement, which 
were modest, ordinary, and exceptional cases of infringement, reflected by the 
wide range of damages in the section.181  However, this section is too often a 
means of abuse.182  The first two categories have become largely irrelevant, as 
willfulness, the main factor for determining an exceptional case, has been too 
easily and too often assigned, resulting in maximum statutory damages.183  
While it is not entirely clear what the reduced number should be, it is more 
likely appropriate that it should be in the lower range of the spectrum, as the 
higher damages currently in place operate at a level of overdeterrence that 
discourages socially beneficial conduct, or in this case, fair use.184 
 
178.  Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 28, at 444; See David Fagundes, Efficient Copyright 
Infringement, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1791, 1816 (2013) (describing the success of several entities in mass 
copyright infringement settlements, such as Righthaven, Masterfile, and Getty).  
179.  Id. 
180.  Id.  
181.  Id. at 445. 
182.  Id. 
183.  Id.  
184.  Thomas Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip v. Morris: The Past, Present, and Future 
of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 468 (2008).  
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Secondly, should the statutory damages remain unchanged, it is likely that 
many wealthier copyright owners would not voluntarily choose to take their 
claims to an alternative venue where possible damages are considerably less, 
as the other obstacles of the federal court remain a beneficial advantage for 
them to force an early settlement in many cases.185  This would cause several 
thousand cases, in fact, the majority of the copyright infringement claims 
currently pursued in federal court, to be left either unheard or terminated before 
completion.186  The goal of hearing more copyright cases, which directly results 
in the hearing of more fair use defenses, would be considerably quickened 
should these wealthier copyright owners have less incentive to file in federal 
courts and were open to pursuing alternate venues, where the cost/benefit ratio 
is easier to meet. 
B. Small Claims Copyright Court 
Currently, every single state in the U.S. has a small claims court.187  While 
these are not as claim specific as the specialty courts proposed below, the 
benefits of the process should be directly applicable.  Small claims courts 
provide an alternative to the courts of general jurisdiction for claimants who do 
not foresee a positive cost/benefit ratio in pursuing the courts of general 
jurisdiction.188  Getting parties to file in a small claims court is accomplished 
through a number of factors, such as limiting and simplifying procedural rules, 
decreasing the necessity for attorneys, and reducing the costs of filing and 
litigating a claim.189  The combination of these factors creates a process that is 
much more accessible and efficient.190 
1. Voluntary 
The most prominent feature of the small claims court is that its system 
would be based entirely on voluntary consent.  Admittedly, there would 
preferably be a system of specialty federal copyright courts, which would be 
mandatory for both parties, cheap, easily accessible, and operated quickly, but 
we could say that about any field of law.  The U.S has created barriers that 
hinder the possibility of a mandatory system conducted without the presence of 
a jury, namely Article III and the Seventh Amendment.191  However, these 
 
185.  Ciolli, supra note 27, at 1003. 
186.  Id.  
187.  PALLANTE, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 154, at 52.  
188.  Id.  
189.  Id.  
190.  Id. 
191.  Bils, supra note 114, at 483–4.  
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barriers are easily overcomed in this case of a voluntary consent.192  Allowing 
for voluntary consent, parties will likely pursue this alternative option, which 
would give parties an option that is cheap, easy, and relatively quick in 
comparison to the federal courts. 
While it is possible that some creators who either can afford the federal 
court system or do not yet trust the new small claims system will not pursue 
these courts, the appeal of not needing to go to federal court provides strong 
incentives, such as a positive cost/benefit ratio and the possibility of 
expediency.  These incentives will be especially beneficial to individuals and 
small enterprises, but will also be beneficial for larger companies as well.193  
State small claims court are often used by businesses to act almost like a judicial 
collection agency.194  While this is often not seen as a good thing by many in 
the public realm, it strongly suggests that copyright infringement claims will be 
filed, meaning fair use defenses can be asserted, and unclear questions can be 
addressed.195  In the short term, it may be painful, but in the long term many of 
those same cases, based on unclear rights, will not be able to be asserted so 
easily, if even at all.  Small claim court systems already operate in every single 
state and are active for a reason.196 
Additionally, as a point of clarification, it is also important to note that 
voluntary consent should operate on an opt-out basis.197  Opt-out means that the 
party claiming infringement would still need to provide service to the 
respondent under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but once 
provided, the respondent would need to respond within a certain limited time, 
with a lack of response operating as consent to the proceedings.198  While 
implementing affirmative consent may seem preferable, it would likely not 
operate as effectively, as infringers could simply ignore the notices 
completely.199 
 
192.  See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848–49 (1986) 
(explaining that personal constitutional rights can be waived, including the right of trial by jury in civil 
cases); Seaboard Lumber Co. v. U.S., 903 F.2d 1560, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (describing that the 
Supreme Court has long recognized that a private litigant may waive its right to a jury and to an Article 
III court in civil cases). 
193.  Bils, supra note 114, at 480.  
194.  Leslie G. Kosmin, The Small Claims Court Dilemma, 13 HOUS. L. REV. 934, 940–41 
(1976). 
195.  Bils, supra note 114, at 480–81.  
196.  Ciolli, supra note 27, at 1023–24.  
197.  PALLANTE, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 154, at 98. 
198.  Id. at 99.  
199.  Id. at 98–99.  
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2. Centralized 
The court should probably at least begin in one centralized location, which 
would most likely be the U.S. Copyright Office.200  In the digital age, the 
possibility of copyright infringement is much less limited to a particular 
geographic area than many other crimes, and it may be difficult for many 
claimants to appear in person.201  To address the difficulty of appearance, the 
court would allow for parties to file their claims through either written or online 
submissions to the office and continue their communications with the court, 
including participation in the trial over several forms of potential 
communication, such as written submissions, telephones, or video 
conference.202  Alternate methods of appearance take away the practical hurdles 
often associated with travel and expense necessary to litigate such claims in a 
traditional federal court system.203  Proximity to the Copyright Office would 
also allow for a source of immediate assistance with the organization of cases 
after their completion, so that cases may become available to the public and 
others in the judicial system. 
3. Costs 
The costs taken on by a claimant in the court would be kept minimal. 
Similar to state small claims courts, they would consist only of a simple filing 
fee, based on the amount of damages claimed, likely ranging from about $30-
$100.204  In the event of a success claim, this fee could be recoverable within 
the damages, similar again to state small claims.205  Further, while hiring an 
attorney would be up to each litigant, there would be no necessity for it, as the 
rules of evidence and procedure would be relaxed, allowing for the panel as 
proposed in the next subsection to provide guidance when making 
determinations.206  The court could also provide information and assistance 
with trial preparation and the filing process that lays out requirements for 
making a claim, available defenses, and information that the parties will want 
prepared.207California and Massachusetts already offer this type of assistance 
on a regular basis, as well as the UK Intellectual Property Enterprise Court, 
discussed in Part II, which could provide various models.208  The availability of 
 
200.  Id. at 103.  
201.  Ciolli, supra note 27, at 1025.  
202.  PALLANTE, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 154, at 102. 
203.  Id.  
204.  Id. at 55–56. 
205.  PALLANTE, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 154, at 59.  
206.  Id. at 57. 
207.  Id. at 56.  
208.  Id.  
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pro se litigation would greatly reduce the costs undertaken by a claimant, 
allowing the full pursuit and defense of claims to their full extent.209 
4. Panel of Copyright Experts 
The cases would appear before a panel of judges who have particular 
expertise in the field of copyright.  The expertise would help expedite the 
process of litigation, as the panel would not need parties to spend time 
discussing and briefing the panel on applying the appropriate law.210  Expertise 
addresses the problem that many federal court judges, as generalist judges, are 
not always equipped to handle the realities and the complexity of copyright 
cases.211  The jurisdiction of the federal courts is so vast that it would be almost 
impossible for judges to develop more than a passing familiarity with many of 
the areas they are called to address, leaving some areas where the Judge has no 
familiarity at all.212 
5. Time 
The cases would likely proceed within around thirty to forty days after the 
filing of the claim by the plaintiff.213  The actual cases themselves should only 
take one to two days to result in a final judgment, as procedures in a small 
claims court are intended to be simple and more informal, with limited 
discovery.214  There should also be no need for additional witnesses or experts, 
as the judges of the court will already have specialized knowledge in the field 
of copyright, and there will not be a jury to instruct.215  While determinations 
of weight and the overall analysis of fair use factors are often complicated, the 
underlying facts both parties must provide are often easily acquired, such as the 
amount and descriptions of the parts taken, the commercial nature of the works, 
and what the contested work is proposing to do.216  This information could be 
provided either within in the initial claim or acquired in the time leading up to 
the hearing.217  Further, the availability of an appeal would be limited to cases 
of fraud, misconduct or material error, so cases would not be unnecessarily 
 
209.  Id. at 57. 
210.  Id. at 99–101.  
211.  Oldfather, supra note 28, at 854–55.  
212.  Id.  
213.  Basic Consideration and Questions, CAL. DEPT. OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS 
http://www.dca.ca.gov/publications/small_claims/basic_info.shtml [https://perma.cc/Z3Y9-RTLW] 
(last visited Aug. 27, 2017). 
214.  Id.  
215.  PALLANTE, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 154, at 99–101. 
216.  Snow, supra note 16, at 1800.  
217.  Id.  
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prolonged.218 
Should the court be immediately overwhelmed with frivolous lawsuits or 
delays, there are several regulatory measures that would be available.219  In 
particular, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already acts as a 
procedural mechanism for this purpose and could be applied to these courts.220  
Also, should these already existing civil procedure mechanisms fail, measures 
could be later added by Congress, such as banning plaintiffs with a history of 
filing such claims or allowing the pursuit of malicious prosecution claims.221 
6. Damages 
The damage cap would initially be set around $10,000-30,000, based on the 
recommendations of the Copyright Office, who surveyed a number of 
organizations such as the Motion Picture Association of America, the American 
Society of Media Photographers, the Graphic Artists Guild, and National Press 
Photographers Association on their willingness to litigate in a small claims 
court based on damages allowed.222  Additionally, the option to elect for 
statutory damages should still be allowed, despite registration of the copyright, 
but it should be offered in drastically reduced figures and in limited 
circumstances, as the current regime under 17 U.S.C. § 504 has proved to be 
grossly excessive.223  The Copyright Office proffered a limit of $7500, per 
infringing work, up to the damage cap, but admitted the possibility that it may 
need to be lower, as this number could still operate as overdeterrence, if 
regularly relied on in situations of limited apparent damage.224  Ideally, 
statutory damages could be eliminated entirely, but the allowance for statutory 
damages takes into consideration the time sensitive nature of the hearings and 
the potential difficulty in determining actual damages.225 
Recognizing the critical nature of damages in these voluntary proceedings, 
it is important to acknowledge that these initial limits should be reassessed as 
 
218.  PALLANTE, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 154, at 129.  
219.  Ciolli, supra note 27, at 1028. 
220.  Id.  
221.  Id. 
222.  Id. at 110–12. 
223.  Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 28, at 480.  See e.g., Childress v. Taylor, 798 F. 
Supp. 981, 996–97 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ($30,000 awarded against defendant for rewrite of previously 
collaborated play, despite no proof of damages); Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy 
Supply Co., 74 F.3d 488, 496 (4th Cir. 1996) ($400,000 awarded against defendant for using similarly 
formed mannequins as plaintiff, actual damages less than $10,000); Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 
472 (2d Cir. 1995) ($100,000 awarded against defendant attempting to sell scarves depicting phrases 
supposedly taken from plaintiffs book, despite no proof of damages). 
224.  PALLANTE, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 154, at 111. 
225.  Id.  
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the court goes forward and further empirical research is conducted.226  The limit 
should be kept low enough to limit exposure and encourage defending parties 
to consent to the voluntary proceedings, but high enough that litigating parties 
believe the proceedings are worth pursuing.227 
7. Limitation of Appeal 
As briefly mentioned above, appeals would be limited to cases of fraud, 
misconduct, or material error.228  Limiting the ability of appeal is done simply 
for the reason that if litigants were allowed to take cases to federal court on 
appeal, many of the benefits regarding time and cost offered by the small claims 
court would disappear.229  Additionally, those parties who received default 
judgments as a result of the opt-out basis of the proceedings would be allowed 
to appeal based on their ability to show excusable neglect on their part.230 
8. Precedent 
Finally, the decisions reached in this specialty copyright court would have 
no binding precedent on federal courts. While this immediately seems counter 
to the goal of this solution, which is to give both the courts and the public a 
better idea of what constitutes derivative works and what constitutes fair use, it 
will still operate as an outlet for persuasive authority.231  The creation of 
persuasive authority on a variety of cases allows copyright users, lawyers, and 
even judges to rely on them in later federal cases.232  Further, it is universally 
accepted that persuasive precedents play an important role in the development 
of legal doctrine.233  The facts, judgments, and opinions of the cases would be 
recorded, organized, and gradually made available to the public. Thus, this 
would cause a larger number of specific factual scenarios that have been legally 
analyzed, decreasing uncertainty. 
While citing to state small claims courts is not a practice usually engaged 
in by the judiciary, the point of focus is that the small claims copyright court 
proposed here would also be a specialty court.  Over time, opinions should 
hopefully begin to hold authoritative value similar to other specialty courts, 
such as the U.S. Tax Court.  The U.S. Tax Court shares several features with 
 
226.  Id. at 109. 
227.  Id.  
228.  Id. at 129.  
229.  Id.  
230.  Id. at 129–130.  
231.  Id. 
232.  Id.  
233.  Grant Lamond, Persuasive Authority in the Law, 17(1) THE HARV. REV. OF PHIL. 16, 16–
17 (2010). 
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the Copyright Court presented here: most claimants can represent themselves; 
there is no jurisdictional limit as to a specific geographic region; judges are tax 
specialists; and jury trials are not available.234  Despite the separated nature of 
U.S. Tax Court from the federal judiciary, the U.S. Tax Court is considered to 
possess higher degrees of technical expertise than other generalist courts.235  
Additionally, the court publishes their regular decisions, normally involving 
debated or new points of law, which are regularly cited to as persuasive legal 
authority in federal jurisdictions and given more weight than U.S. district court 
opinions on the same tax issue.236 
CONCLUSION 
There is a paradox present within copyright law, which is effectively 
hobbling the goals of copyright.237  This paradox occurs because transformative 
works are protected by both the exclusive rights of creators under 17 U.S.C. § 
106 and by the fair use factors under 17 U.S.C. § 107.  Understanding the 
history behind the development of these sections sheds some light on how this 
situation developed, but unfortunately, does little to address the problem.  
While the immediate reaction to solving this problem seems apparent, to simply 
get rid of one of these protections, neither section can or should be eliminated, 
as they both have still have value to the copyright system.238 
Presently, it is up to the federal courts to examine unique factual scenarios 
and gradually interpret the flexible fair use standard, so that it is clear which 
kind of transformative works constitute derivative works and which constitute 
fair use.  However, the federal courts are ill-equipped to provide this necessary 
function, as they hear relatively few cases involving claims of fair use per year, 
which directly affects their ability to create new judicial policy.239  The lack of 
litigation occurs due to several factors such as the cost of a trial, the time 
necessary to litigate, and the statutory damages that are available when pursuing 
copyright infringement claims in the federal courts.240  The combination of 
 
234.  About the Court, UNITED STATES TAX COURT, https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/about.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5BSG-JZGK] (last updated Aug. 5, 2016). 
235.  Crimm, supra note 35, at 74. 
236.  American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, U.S. Federal Tax Law Hierarchy 
(2016) https://www.aicpa.org/InterestAreas/Tax/Resources/practicemanagement/Downloadable
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these factors causes the majority of people not to file their cases, to settle their 
cases to early, or to withdraw their cases.241  The result is an unworkable process 
for interpreting fair use, as fair use operates as a shield and not a sword.242  A 
person cannot assert fair use until someone else brings a copyright infringement 
case.243  Therefore, unique factual scenarios cannot be assigned a position on 
the sliding scale that is the flexible standard of fair use until a copyright 
infringement case concludes, and the court publishes a judicial opinion.244 
To address the issue that the current federal system is not adequately 
interpreting these competing copyright statutes or their application to 
transformative works, this article offers a two-fold solution. First, the federal 
courts should reduce the statutory damages available in cases that do not 
involve direct reproductions of an entire work.  Second, a specialty small claims 
courts, which deals only with copyright claims, should be created.  While these 
courts would only be a voluntary alternative to the federal court, they would 
have large benefits, as the reduced time and cost would be beneficial to both 
claimants and defendants.245  Additionally, as defendants would have less 
reason to be afraid of litigating a full fair use defense with reduced damages, 
judicial opinions could be created applying to the individual factual scenarios 
of each case, decreasing uncertainty for later judges, lawyers, and claimants.246  
While the precedent set in these cases would not be immediately binding on the 
federal courts, it would allow for the creation of persuasive authority, which the 
federal courts could then use as guidance in their decisions to create binding 
precedent.247  The introduction of persuasive authority would not be an 
immediate solution to solving the paradox present between § 106(2) and § 
107(1), but it would provide guidelines for their proper application on an influx 
of new cases, causing interpretation to proceed at a much faster rate than is 
offered by the current federal court system.  The aim of argument, or discussion, 
should not be victory, but progress.248 
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